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This Article deals primarily with choice-of-law problems in state and 
federal courts.  A subset of the broader issues of conflict of laws, choice 
of law involves the decision regarding which substantive legal rule(s) 
will apply in a particular case.  While that decision can be 
straightforward in cases involving parties from only one state and events 
that occurred in that same state, problems quickly emerge when, for 
example, parties are from different states or the events giving rise to the 
suit occurred in a state other than the forum state. 
Historically, courts confronted with tricky choice-of-law problems 
have used different approaches to determine which law to apply.  Choice 
of law has, in all but two states,1 developed as a common law doctrine of 
state law.  And up until the mid-twentieth century, states’ choice-of-law 
provisions developed with an eye toward respecting the territorial 
sovereignty of the place where a legal right was thought to have vested.  
This “vested rights” approach emphasized different territorial rules for 
different areas of law.2 
Around the middle of the twentieth century, however, scholars and 
judges grew discontent with the rigid formalism of the vested rights 
approach.3  If, for example, two citizens of state A just happened to get 
into a car accident while driving in state B, but brought suit in the courts 
of state A, why should the law of state B control?  While the accident 
 
*  Litigation associate, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago; J.D. with high honors, 2019, University of 
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Rachel Granetz for constant assistance, editorial and otherwise.  The views in this Article are my 
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 1. Louisiana and Oregon have statutorily mandated choice-of-law rules.  See generally James 
A.R. Nafziger, The Louisiana and Oregon Codifications of Choice-of-Law Rules in Context, 58 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 165 (2010).  
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. See infra Section II.A. 
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occurred in that state, every other factor in the case (the domicile of both 
parties and the forum) point to the application of state A’s law.  
Motivated by these sorts of intuitions, courts began moving away from a 
territorial approach to conflicts and toward other methods for choice-of-
law analysis that focused on the contacts of each state with the dispute, 
the interest that each state had in seeing its law applied to govern a 
particular case, or the relative merits of the substantive laws in question 
(abstracted away from the particulars of the specific case). 
These new approaches were not without their own problems.  The 
newer choice-of-law schemes gave judges more flexibility to apply the 
law of the state most connected to a controversy overall,4 rather than the 
law of the state where the last act giving rise to the cause of action 
occurred.  But with these changes came the concern that the new 
approaches gave judges too much latitude to engage in state-based 
favoritism, promoting the interests of their forum states or showing 
preference for their forum states’ own citizens.  Indeed, some of the new 
theories were expressly premised on the idea that state legislation was 
designed to protect the interests of state residents and not outsiders and 
that judges should give effect to that legislative intent. 
Seeking to mollify these concerns about the favoritism of state court 
judges, at least one early proponent of the new choice-of-law approaches 
proposed an additional procedural innovation.5  According to this view, 
while choice of law should be sensitive to the relative interests of the 
states whose law might be applied in a given case, state court judges 
should not themselves consider those interests.  Instead, federal judges, 
who are life-tenured, federal rather than state actors, and perhaps 
therefore more neutral than state judges, ought to make choice-of-law 
determinations. 
This Article considers that procedural suggestion.  In particular, this 
Article examines the merits of having federal judges, rather than state 
court judges, make choice-of-law determinations under nonterritorial 
choice-of-law approaches.6  The Article then considers the procedural 
mechanisms that might be created to facilitate such a review, as well as 
 
 4. Indeed, judicial flexibility under the newer systems is even greater than this sentence 
suggests, as some conflicts systems allow judges to make choice-of-law determinations issue-by-
issue rather than for the controversy as a whole.  The process of dividing up a case into separate 
issues, each presenting its own choice-of-law question, is known as “dépeçage.”  Dépeçage is 
inconsistent with the First Restatement.  See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 801–03 
(Ind. 2004).  But some later theories do embrace the practice.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
 5. See infra Section II.D. 
 6. See infra Section III.A.  
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the conceptual benefits and drawbacks of assigning federal courts this 
role.  This Article will also consider how this vision of federal court 
involvement in choice-of-law decisions squares with the Constitution, 
particularly with the Supreme Court’s holding that federal courts sitting 
in diversity must apply state, rather than federal, conflicts law. 
This Article has four parts.  Part I lays out the basics of the 
traditional territorial approach to choice of law.  Part II briefly 
summarizes the move away from territoriality and toward consideration 
of state interests and contacts.  With this shift came a greater role for 
judges.  Interest- or contacts-based systems require judges to evaluate 
two or more states’ competing interests in a particular case.  That 
evaluation includes consideration of state policy goals and a judgment 
about the fit between a broad state policy and the facts of a particular 
case.  The evolution of conflicts from rigid territoriality to evaluation of 
state interests and purposes continues to this day, as the Draft 
Restatement (Third) of Conflicts of Law illustrates. 
Because such evaluation can be highly sensitive to the importance 
placed on a particular state’s policy goals, Part III examines the 
mechanisms by which we might move conflicts consideration to federal 
courts.  Those mechanisms require reviewing conflicts’ place under the 
Erie doctrine and potential congressional authority to create uniform 
conflicts law under the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Part 
IV then advances a specific proposal for federal court determination of 
choice-of-law questions.  This Article suggests that a state appellate 
courts faced with a choice-of-law decision based on state interests or 
similar concerns should certify such a question to a federal court of 
appeals for resolution in a neutral federal forum.  Part IV also considers 
potential concerns associated with such a proposal. 
I. TRADITIONAL CHOICE OF LAW AND VESTED RIGHTS 
Early American choice-of-law theory focused on a territorial 
approach.7  When faced with a situation in which multiple states might 
reasonably be thought to have some claim to the application of their laws 
to a particular dispute, early theory resolved the conflict in favor of the 
state in which a legal right had arisen.  This so-called vested rights 
approach derived from a strong sense of the territorial sovereignty of the 
 
 7. This Part speaks interchangeably of early choice-of-law theory, the traditional approach to 
choice of law, the lex loci approach, and the First Restatement approach to conflicts.  Any reference 
to the traditional conflicts theory is meant to refer to a model of conflicts that emphasizes vested 
rights and territoriality. 
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states.  As Joseph Beale explained, “[T]he power of a state is supreme 
within its own territory, [so] no other state can exercise power there. . . .  
It follows generally that no statute has force to affect any person, thing, 
or act . . . outside the territory of the state that passed it.”8  The emphasis 
on territorial sovereignty present in traditional conflicts of law 
approaches gave rise to the general lex loci rule, indicating the “law of 
the place” of the last relevant act necessary to give rise to a legal right is 
the law that governs an action concerning that right.9 
Indeed, according to the vested rights approach, the term “conflict of 
laws” is something of a misnomer.  The traditional understanding is that 
the territorial law of the place where the legal right vested is totally 
sovereign.  In theory, then, there should never be a “conflict” between 
two different laws—the laws of the territorial sovereign control legal 
rights to the exclusion of all other potential sources of law.  The task of a 
choice-of-law theory, under the traditional view, was not to decide which 
law among several viable candidates should be given priority, but was 
rather to provide rules for determining where a given legal right came 
into being.10  Once the location of the vested right could be determined, 
the choice of what law to apply was easy.11 
Formally, the First Restatement of Conflicts of Laws codified the 
vested rights approach.12  Take, for example, the First Restatement’s 
approach to tort claims.  The First Restatement directs that the 
substantive law of the place of the wrong applies in tort actions, where 
“[t]he place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to 
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.”13  Similarly, issues 
in contract are generally governed by the law of the place where a formal 
contractual right accrued.  Because the last act giving rise to a valid 
contract is usually acceptance, the law of the place of acceptance 
generally controls for questions of contract validity (i.e., whether a 
 
 8. 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 61.1, at 311–12 (1935). 
 9. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281 (N.Y. 1963) (examining sources and 
explaining that the traditional lex loci approach “had its conceptual foundation in the vested rights 
doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law of the 
jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its existence and extent solely on such law”). 
 10. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2448 (1999) [hereinafter Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law] (distinguishing 
between rules of “scope” and “conflicts rules” or rules of “priority” in conflicts of law). 
 11. Id. at 2455 (stating that the territorial approach, in the eyes of Joseph Beale, provides “a 
relatively easy answer to the question of what law governs a particular occurrence”).  
 12. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 13. Id. § 377.  Because injury is usually the last act necessary to create a vested right in tort, the 
place of injury generally controls. 
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contract arose and whether any such contract is valid).14  When, 
however, the contested issue in a case deals with a breach of contract, 
rather than contract validity, the First Restatement directs courts to look 
to the place of performance for the applicable legal standard.15 
The territoriality concerns of the First Restatement are perhaps 
nowhere more prominent than in its approach to conflicts questions 
affecting property.  The First Restatement provides that, “The original 
creation of property in a tangible thing is governed by the law of the state 
where the thing is at the time of the events which create the interests.”16  
For real property, then, the law of the state where the land is will always 
control.  For chattel, the law of the place where the chattel is at the time 
the right accrues controls.17 
The strictly territorial logic of the First Restatement’s vested rights 
approach to choice-of-law questions produces a conflicts system with a 
formally discernable task for judges: determine whether the party before 
the court has a vested legal right; then determine the place where the 
legal right at issue actually became enforceable; and then apply the law 
of that place.  But the rule-based formality of the First Restatement 
approach sometimes led to questionable outcomes.18  When the “last act” 
necessary to give rise to a legal right took place in State B, but all of the 
precursor events took place in State A and the parties themselves were 
domiciliaries of State A, the formality of the First Restatement produced 
 
 14. See id. § 311 cmt. d (“[I]n determining the place of contracting, the forum ascertains the 
place in which, under the general law of Contracts, the principal event necessary to make a contract 
occurs.”). 
 15. See id. § 358 (“The duty for the performance of which a party to a contract is bound will be 
discharged by compliance with the law of the place of performance of the promise . . . .”).  This 
principle becomes difficult to apply as the contract becomes more complex.  For example, contracts 
involving commerce in multiple states or governing acquisition of assets spread across the country 
may involve performance in many different places under a single contract. 
 16. Id. § 211. 
 17. See id. §§ 255–258.  Capacity to convey a chattel, the formalities required for conveyance, 
validity of a conveyance, and the nature of an interest resulting from conveyance are all determined 
by the law of the place where the chattel is at the time of the conveyance.  Id. 
 18. The outcomes of conflicts-of-law cases under the First Restatement can be “questionable” 
in at least two ways.  First, as used here, the First Restatement sometimes leads to results in tension 
with ordinary notions of which law ought to control a given sequence of events.  That is, even when 
the First Restatement implies a result that is perfectly predictable, that result might nevertheless be 
questionable because it is contrary to expectations.  In those circumstances, we can think of the First 
Restatement as introducing some error costs into the choice-of-law system, but perhaps those error 
costs are offset by lower decision costs associated with predictable rules.  But a result under the First 
Restatement might be questionable because the First Restatement itself leaves room for judicial 
discretion.  See infra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.  In those cases, the rule-based approach of 
the First Restatement breaks down.  The resulting outcome potentially imposes not only an error 
cost, but also decision costs resulting from exercises of judicial discretion and a lack of 
predictability. 
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counterintuitive results.19 
Such counterintuitive results of the First Restatement’s territorial 
emphasis are not difficult to produce.20  But the First Restatement does 
not leave courts wholly without resources to avoid arbitrary or unfair 
outcomes.  For one thing, the strict territorial rules of the First 
Restatement apply only for a given type of legal claim—tort is governed 
by the place of injury, contract by the place of contracting, and so on.  If 
there is some flexibility in how a party characterizes a claim, then it is 
possible to find corresponding flexibility in which law will apply under 
the First Restatement.21 
Other parts of the First Restatement also provide some potential 
relief from the seeming inexorability of the territorial approach.  For 
example, the First Restatement included a public policy exception to a 
legal right “created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary 
 
 19. One case that illustrates this difficulty is Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll, 
11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).  There, an employee of the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, 
W.D. Carroll, was injured when a link between two railcars broke.  Carroll was a citizen of 
Alabama, the railroad was an Alabama corporation, the employment contract between the two 
parties was negotiated and signed in Alabama, and the negligent inspection which missed the 
weakness in the link took place in Alabama.  Id. at 803–04.  But the railroad’s line took it between 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Meridian, Mississippi, and the link actually broke and caused Carroll’s 
injury while the train was in Mississippi.  Id. at 804.  The choice-of-law issue was important to the 
case because an Alabama statute provided that employees could recover against their employers for 
injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow employee.  Id. at 805.  In contrast, Mississippi still 
followed the common law “fellow servant” rule, which denied recovery for such injuries.  Id.  The 
Alabama Supreme Court applied Mississippi law, exemplifying the lex loci approach.  The Court 
declared: 
The only true doctrine is that each sovereignty, state or nation, has the exclusive power to 
finally determine and declare what act or omissions in the conduct of one to another . . . 
shall impose a liability in damages for the consequent injury, and the courts of no other 
sovereignty can impute a damnifying quality to an act or omission which afforded no 
cause of action where it transpired. 
Id. at 808–09. 
 20. In property, see Blackwell v. Lurie, 71 P.3d 509, 511–12 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (holding 
that a sketch book owned by Montana domiciliaries and on consignment to a gallery in New Mexico 
was owned as tenancy by the entirety property because the sketch book had been acquired in 
Missouri).  In contract, see Burr v. Beckler, 106 N.E. 206, 209 (Ill. 1914) (holding that a married 
woman lacked capacity to contract under the law of coverture when she mailed her acceptance from 
Florida, which had coverture law, despite the woman being an Illinois citizen and the contract’s 
concerning a transaction in Illinois secured by Illinois property). 
 21. See, e.g., Haumschild v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959).  In Haumschild, a 
Wisconsin couple had been driving in California, where they were injured in a car accident.  Id. at 
814.  California law provided for interspousal immunity so that a wife could not recover against her 
husband in tort, but Wisconsin had no such immunity.  Id. at 815.  While the First Restatement 
would perhaps indicate that California’s law should apply to a tort claim where California was the 
place of injury, the Wisconsin Supreme Court instead applied Wisconsin law regarding interspousal 
immunity.  Id. at 820.  The Wisconsin court reasoned that the issue in the case was not actually one 
of tort law but instead one of family law, since the purpose of the immunity was “preventing family 
discord” rather than tort policy.  Id. at 817–18. 
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to the strong public policy of the forum.”22  In addition, the First 
Restatement provides that “[a]ll matters of procedure are governed by the 
law of the forum.”23  While the basic substance-versus-procedure 
distinction is familiar from the Erie context, it operates somewhat 
differently in the choice-of-law context.  Rather than asking whether a 
given rule “really regulates procedure,”24 courts in conflicts cases ask 
whether the law in question is “a condition of the cause of action itself” 
or rather goes to the enforcement of a potentially vested right by a court 
rather than to the right’s substance.25  The key, in other words, is whether 
the issue affects the vesting of a legal right or merely regulates the 
procedure by which that vested right is enforced in a particular court. 
While this view is consistent with the vested rights approach at a 
conceptual level, it provides some leeway for judges to consider whether 
the law at issue is so tightly bound up with the existence of a vested right 
so as to count as substantive, or whether it deals instead with procedural 
enforcement.  That leeway within the First Restatement—and courts’ 
reliance on it to avoid difficult outcomes—foreshadows the eventual 
move away from the First Restatement to conflicts theories that embrace 
a more judgment-based test.26 
II. THE CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION 
Uniform adherence to the First Restatement in American courts was 
short lived, lasting only until about 1950.  Driven by dissatisfaction with 
the rigidity of the First Restatement approach and the view that 
characterization, public policy, and other sources of judicial flexibility 
were unsatisfactory mechanisms for introducing discretion, choice of law 
underwent what is commonly referred to as a revolution starting in the 
mid-twentieth century.27  Alternative approaches led judges to focus on 
 
 22. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 23. Id. § 585. 
 24. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 410 (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1941)). 
 25. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 595 cmt. a. 
 26. For one of the earliest critiques of the First Restatement cataloging judges’ use of these so-
called escape devices in the theory, see Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924).  Professor Walter Wheeler Cook’s argument utilized a 
distinctively legal realist approach.  He rejected the appeal of an a priori theory of conflicts and 
instead sought to derive rules for conflicts-of-law cases by observing and categorizing judicial 
behavior.  Id. at 460.  That exercise led Cook to conclude that judges applied the First Restatement 
inconsistently and to question whether any system of conflicts could achieve the algorithmic 
predictability to which the First Restatement aspired.  Id. at 475–79.  
 27. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, ‘Vestedness,’ and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1196–
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the “contacts” that states had to particular disputes,28 the “interest” that a 
particular state had in seeing its law applied to resolve a given case,29 or 
the “superiority” of a particular legal rule after a judicial evaluation of 
the candidate laws that might apply to a case to determine which was 
“the better rule of law.”30  This Part begins by introducing, in broad 
strokes, the substance of some of the post-First Restatement conflicts 
approaches.  That narrative goes all the way to the present, as there 
currently exists a Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws that 
seeks to build on the lessons learned during the decades since the choice-
of-law revolution.31 
Next, this Part discusses an oft-forgotten aspect of the original 
discussion surrounding the move away from strict territoriality in choice 
of law: procedural and forum-based considerations.  The choice-of-law 
revolution sought to restore some power to judges to deal pragmatically 
with choice-of-law issues rather than remaining bound by the rigid 
territoriality of the First Restatement.  But in introducing that flexibility, 
scholars advocating for new choice-of-law theories recognized that state 
courts might be imperfect fora for administration of a system introducing 
more judicial discretion.  The concern was that state court judges might 
use their discretion to decide choice-of-law issues reflexively in favor of 
the law of the forum.  As such, early leaders of the choice-of-law 
revolution proposed that federal courts, rather than state courts, should 
make choice-of-law determinations.  The final Section of this Part 
develops and evaluates this underemphasized aspect of the revolution’s 
 
1203 (1987). 
 28. See, e.g., Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101–02 (N.Y. 1954) (“Turning to the case before 
us, examination of the respective contacts with New York and England compels the conclusion that 
it is English law which must be applied to determine the impact and effect to be given the wife’s 
institution of the separation suit.”).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
6(2)(b)–(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (incorporating interest analysis). 
 29. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 910 (Cal. 1961) (“[W]e can give effect to the 
common law policy of both states to enforce lawful contracts and sustain Nevada’s interest in 
protecting its residents and their reasonable expectations growing out of a transaction substantially 
related to that state without subordinating any legitimate interest of this state.”). 
 30. See Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. 
L. REV. 1584, 1587–88 (1966).  Note that Professor Leflar’s original scholarship sought to be 
descriptive rather than normative—he noticed that courts were sometimes influenced by their 
judgment of which law in a conflicts case led to better results.  Courts subsequently applied his 
theory normatively, using their determination of which was the “better law” in a conflicts case as a 
justification for application of that law in a particular dispute.  See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 203 
N.W.2d 408, 417 (Minn. 1973) (“In that posture, we are concerned that our courts not be called upon 
to determine issues under rules which, however, accepted they may be in other states, are 
inconsistent with our own concept of fairness and equity.”). 
 31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)  OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM .  LAW INST . , Council 
Draft No. 2, Sept. 12, 2017). 
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intellectual foundation. 
A. The Early Break 
The judicial origins of the choice-of-law revolution trace back to a 
series of New York state court decisions in the 1950s.32  Beginning with 
two cases involving family law support obligations,33 New York courts 
showed some willingness to set aside the First Restatement rule that the 
place of contracting should govern a separation agreement.  In Auten v. 
Auten, the New York Court of Appeals described a process of assessing 
the “place with the most significant contacts” to determine which law to 
apply to a dispute.34  The court’s “most significant contacts” formulation 
is important because it employs a test wholly foreign to the First 
Restatement’s territorial approach.35  While other courts would reach 
similar practical outcomes using characterization or other techniques 
internal to the First Restatement approach,36 the Auten court did not even 
purport to apply the First Restatement.37 
New York courts continued to break with the First Restatement in 
the following years in a series of cases involving car accidents.  A 
recurring question during that time was whether New York courts would 
enforce so-called guest statutes, which were laws that prevented a 
passenger from suing a host-driver in tort for injuries sustained in car 
accidents.38  New York had no such statute, but cases arose in which its 
courts had to determine whether guest statutes should apply to accidents 
that occurred in states or countries where the statutes were in force when 
the accident involved New York parties.39 
In Babcock v. Jackson, New York courts first confronted the 
question when a car accident in Ontario, Canada, injured New York 
citizens.40  Ontario had a guest statute, which, if applied, would have 
barred the New York passengers from recovering against the New York 
 
 32. See generally Willis L.M. Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 
548 (1971) [hereinafter Reese, Chief Judge Fuld]. 
 33. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 103–04 (N.Y. 1954); Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 
(N.Y. 1961). 
 34. Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 103. 
 35. Id. at 101–02 (discussing the First Restatement approach before applying an analysis about 
significant contacts). 
 36. See, e.g., Haumschild v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814, 820 (Wis. 1959). 
 37. Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 103.  The court did, however, note that it would reach the same 
outcome applying either approach.  Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 280. 
 40. Id. 
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driver.41  While the place of injury was Canada, both parties were New 
York residents, where the vehicle at issue was also registered and 
insured.42  Setting aside the “traditional choice of law rule . . . that the 
substantive rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are 
determinable by the law of the place of the tort,”43 the New York Court 
of Appeals instead centered its analysis on “contacts.”44  The court 
explained, “Comparison of the relative ‘contacts’ and ‘interests’ of New 
York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-a-vis the issue here presented, 
makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably the 
greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best 
minimal.”45  The court dismissed Ontario’s status as the place of injury 
as a “purely adventitious circumstance” that should not outweigh all of 
the other ties to New York present in the facts before the court.46 
The New York Court of Appeals then announced a more general 
statement of the state’s approach to guest-statute cases in Neumeier v. 
Kuehner.47  Again, the court emphasized not territoriality but rather the 
relative interests of the states involved in the case and the purposes 
behind each state’s policy.48  For example, the court considered the 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 284. 
 43. Id. at 281 (citations omitted). 
 44. Id. at 283–84. 
 45. Id. at 284.  Perhaps one can resist the assertion that it is indeed “unquestionable” that New 
York had the more direct interest in the accident.  While the residency of the parties, the insurance, 
and the registration of the vehicle pointed toward New York, Ontario does have an interest in how 
the law shapes drivers’ behavior on Ontario roads.  But New York courts considered guest statutes to 
be “loss-allocating” rather than “conduct-regulating” rules, meaning that the primary effect of the 
rule is to determine which party will bear a loss rather than to identify particular acts as wrongful.  
While a state does have a strong interest in applying a rule aimed at regulating conduct within its 
borders, it is thought that parties’ common domicile provides an overwhelming interest in favor of 
applying a loss-allocating rule of that domicile.  For more on this distinction, see Wendy Collins 
Perdue, A Reexamination of the Distinction Between “Loss-Allocating” and “Conduct-Regulating 
Rules,” 60 LA. L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2000). 
 46. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284.  The Court of Appeals of New York reaffirmed the reasoning 
of Babcock in Tooker v. Lopez, which again involved a car accident between New York citizens that 
occurred in Michigan, a state with a guest statute.  249 N.E.2d 394, 395 (N.Y. 1969).  The common 
citizenship of the parties involved in the accident and suit was enough to overcome the traditional 
application of the law of the place of injury, with the court again emphasizing New York’s superior 
interest in the case.  Id. at 398 (“[I]t is clear that New York has the only real interest in whether 
recovery should be granted and that the application of Michigan law ‘would defeat a legitimate 
interest of the forum State without serving a legitimate interest of any other State.’” (quoting 
Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 576, 584 (1969))). 
 47. 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972). 
 48. See id. (“[I]n Babcock v. Jackson, . . . we were willing to sacrifice the certainty provided by 
the old rule for the more just, fair and practical result that may best be achieved by giving controlling 
effect to the law of the jurisdiction which has the greatest concern with, or interest in, the specific 
issue raised in the litigation.” (citation omitted)). 
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purpose of the guest statute to be either “to protect Ontario defendants 
and their insurers against collusive claims”49 or “to protect owners and 
drivers against ungrateful guests.”50  But, the court explained, “New 
York has a deep interest in protecting its own residents, injured in a 
foreign state, against unfair or anachronistic statutes of that state.”51 
From these principles, the Neumeier court derived three general rules 
for determining whether a foreign guest statute would apply to bar 
recovery by a New York plaintiff.  First, if the domicile of the passenger 
and driver is the same, then the law of that state should control.52  
Second, if the driver’s conduct occurred in her home state and that state 
would protect the driver from liability, then the driver’s home-state law 
applies.53  Similarly, if the accident occurred in the passenger’s home 
state and the law of that state allows recovery, then the law of the 
passenger’s state applies.54  In other words, the court reasoned that the 
law of the state where the injury occurred should apply if that law 
benefits a party domiciled in that state in cases where the citizenship of 
the parties differs.55  Finally, where the passenger and driver are 
domiciled in different states but the law of the state of injury does not 
favor a citizen-party of that state, the court defaults to the law of the 
place of injury but can consider other factors.56 
B. Scholarly Contributions: Interest Analysis 
The “Neumeier Rules” map well onto a more general conflicts 
approach, interest analysis––an approach championed by Professor 
Brainerd Currie and developed in response to dissatisfaction with the 
territorial emphasis of the First Restatement.  Writing around the same 
time as the New York Court of Appeals broke from the traditional 
approach, Currie advocated for a conflicts system that “inquire[s] into 
 
 49. Id. at 455 (citing Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 283–84). 
 50. Id. (quoting Reese, Chief Judge Fuld, supra note 32, at 558). 
 51. Id. at 456. 
 52. Id. at 457. 
 53. Id. at 457–58. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  In this way, the New York Court of Appeals traded one form of inconsistency under the 
First Restatement (which gives different outcomes depending on where the accident occurred, 
independent of the citizenship of the driver) for another under the Neumeier rules (which give 
different outcomes depending on the location of the accident and the citizenship of the driver).  
While both rules are internally consistent, the question of which rules provide more predictable and 
satisfying outcomes likely depends on one’s prior assumptions about the desirability of territorial 
sovereignty as opposed to citizenship-based interests. 
 56. Id. at 458.  
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the policies expressed in the respective laws, and into the circumstances 
in which it is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest in 
the application of those policies.”57  In Currie’s view, choice-of-law 
decisions should proceed not as an algorithmic process but rather as an 
exercise in statutory interpretation.58  As Currie explained, interest 
analysis “is essentially the familiar [process] of construction or 
interpretation.59  “Just as we determine by that process how a statute 
applies in time, and how it applies to marginal domestic situations, so we 
may determine how it should be applied to cases involving foreign 
elements in order to effectuate the legislative purpose.”60 
Interest analysis, in its original formulation, operates from the 
premise that a state’s laws are intended to apply principally to situations 
in which the laws benefit domiciliaries of that state.61  The Ontario guest 
statute, for example, should be interpreted to protect Ontario citizens 
from being potentially liable to their guests; but the statute should not 
also be read to extend the same interest in protection to New Yorkers, 
even when involved in a crash on Ontario roads.  Interest analysis thus 
leads to straightforward results in situations like those described in the 
second Neumeier rule: situations in which there is a statute at issue that is 
designed to protect one of the parties in the litigation.62  These situations 
are, in Currie’s terminology, “false conflicts”—what on the surface 
appears to be a conflict of laws between two states actually dissolves 
when courts consider whether the states’ purposes for enacting the statute 
apply in the instant case.63 
More difficult for interest analysis are situations involving either 
“true conflicts” or “unprovided-for cases.”64  In the former, both states’ 
laws can be reasonably interpreted to apply to a particular controversy.65  
 
 57. Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of 
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1963) [hereinafter Currie, Comments on Babcock v. 
Jackson]. 
 58. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE 
L.J. 171, 178 (1959) [hereinafter Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives].  This aspect of Currie’s 
theory has been an emphasis of the Draft Third Restatement’s approach. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See generally John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting Its Own, 
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981). 
 62. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457 (N.Y. 1972). 
 63. William M. Richman, Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding on Interest 
Analysis, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 317, 318–19 (1982) (explaining that a false conflict occurs when “only 
one state’s policy is advanced by application of its law”). 
 64. Id. at 320–23. 
 65. Id. at 320. 
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In one famous example, an Oregon resident entered into a business 
contract in California with a California citizen.66  Unbeknownst to the 
California party, the Oregon citizen had been declared a spendthrift 
under Oregon law, a protection not known to California law.67  Thus, 
California had an interest in the case in enforcing contracts entered into 
in California and in providing recovery for its citizen, but Oregon also 
had an interest under its own law of enforcing spendthrift determinations 
and protecting its citizen.68  Cases such as these are said to present “true 
conflicts” because a straightforward interpretation of each state’s law 
shows that it was intended to apply to the case before the court.69  In such 
cases, Currie advocated for a careful “reconsideration” of the interests 
underlying each statute and then, if the true conflict persisted, default 
application of the law of the forum.70 
The difficulty of the “unprovided-for case” is similar to, though the 
inverse of, the true conflict case.  In an unprovided-for case, neither 
state’s law seems to apply to the dispute.71  Consider a permutation of the 
guest statute cases in which an Ontario passenger is injured by a New 
York driver.72  Application of the Ontario statute would serve to bar 
recovery benefiting an Ontario citizen, an outcome in which Ontario is 
presumably not interested.73  Similarly, application of New York law 
would impose liability on the driver, which might be thought contrary to 
the State of New York’s interests.  In such cases, Currie again advocated 
 
 66. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 543–44 (Or. 1964) (en banc). 
 67. Id.  
 68. See id. at 546–48. 
 69. See Richman, supra note 63, at 320–21 (discussing and diagramming the true conflict 
dilemma in Lilienthal). 
 70. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 57, at 1242–43. 
 71. Richman, supra note 63, at 322. 
 72. The location of the accident is not significant for the purposes of the hypothetical because 
interest analysis is not territorially focused. 
 73. While the presumption that states are interested only in or at least primarily in the 
application of their laws to promote the interests of their own citizens does cohere with the interest 
analysis approach, it is not without controversy.  For example, Professor Douglas Laycock has 
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause should be read to make a 
state’s exclusive preference for its own citizens unconstitutional.  See Douglas Laycock, Equal 
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 264 (1992) (“Any discrimination against visiting citizens of sister states harms 
the victim and strikes a small blow against national unity.  Discrimination against citizens of sister 
states, justified only by a preference for locals or a view that the state has no interest in protecting 
outsiders, undermines our tendency to think of ourselves as a single people and leaves the victims 
with a legitimate sense of raw injustice.”).  Resolution of the constitutional worry is unnecessary for 
this Article, but procedural mechanisms that place the determination of when a state is “interested” 
in application of its law into the hands of a more neutral federal judge may help to ameliorate some 
of the discriminatory concerns that Laycock raises. 
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for a default application of forum law.74 
Substantively, Currie’s interest analysis scholarship has been 
influential.  California and the District of Columbia explicitly follow 
interest analysis to resolve conflicts of law in tort cases,75 and the Second 
Restatement of Conflicts of Law incorporates state interests as one of the 
general principles guiding choice-of-law decisions.76  In addition, the 
willingness of interest analysis to elevate state interests over rule-based 
territoriality paved the way for other standards-based methods of 
conflicts resolution such as comparative impairment and better law. 
During the period of flux ushered in by the scholarly break with 
territoriality in choice of law, the American Law Institute began work on 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law.77  The Second Restatement 
was eventually published in 1971, but, conscious of the rapid rate of 
doctrinal evolution in choice of law at the time, the Second Restatement 
was positioned as a “transitional work.”78  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, 
the Second Restatement gives few definite rules for choice-of-law 
problems.  Instead, the centerpiece of the Second Restatement is section 
6, which provides a laundry list of factors that judges ought to consider 
when deciding which law has the “most significant relationship” to a 
given dispute.79  Section 6, subsection 2 instructs courts to consider: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative 
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
 
 74. See Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of 
Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 229–30 (1958) (noting that frustration of one state’s interest is 
inevitable in such cases).  But see Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-for” Case, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 1045, 1051–52 (1989) (arguing that unprovided for cases should simply be dismissed as failing 
to state a claim under any potentially applicable law). 
 75. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2017: Thirty-First 
Annual Survey, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 61 (2018) (charting choice-of-law methods for all fifty states, 
Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico). 
 76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b)–(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) 
(“[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include . . . the relevant policies of 
the forum, [and] . . . the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those 
states in the determination of the particular issue . . . .”). 
 77. Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Second Restatement, 28 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 679, 679–80 (1963).  
 78. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L. 
REV. 501, 519 (1983). 
 79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
2020] CONFLICTS OF LAW 509 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.80 
In contrast to the algorithmic processes of the First Restatement 
approach, the Second Restatement embraces more of an “all-things-
considered” test.  That test provides a large degree of flexibility for 
judges seeking to avoid the counterintuitive results of application of the 
First Restatement to some cases, but it also creates a more substantial 
role for judges sifting among the various factors within section 6. 
Despite (or, more cynically, perhaps because of) the lack of firm 
answers provided in the Second Restatement approach, it has proven 
very popular among states.81  For all its popularity, however, the Second 
Restatement has done little to settle many of the core issues in conflicts 
law that have persisted since the very beginning of the choice-of-law 
revolution. 
C. The Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflicts of Law 
With the Second Restatement having caught on in a majority of the 
states but with significant divergence in states’ choice-of-law 
methodologies still present, the American Law Institute has 
commissioned work on a Third Restatement of Conflicts of Law.  That 
document, currently in draft form, has been described by its Reporter, 
Professor Kermit Roosevelt III, as an attempt “to survey the practice of 
courts using the Restatement (Second) and other modern approaches; to 
consider codifications in the United States and elsewhere; and to 
determine when practice converges sufficiently to allow the formulation 
of appropriately narrow and policy-sensitive rules.”82  This, Roosevelt 
suggests, is the natural and intended progression from the Second 
Restatement, which was originally intended as “more of a means of 
 
 80. Id. § 6(2). 
 81. The best available data indicate that the Second Restatement is used in twenty-five of fifty-
two surveyed jurisdictions.  See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
2018: Thirty-Second Annual Survey, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 35 (2019) [hereinafter Symeonides, 
Choice of Law in 2018]. 
 82. Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan R. Jones, The Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of 
Laws: A Response to Brilmayer & Listwa, 128 YALE L.J. F. 293, 295 (2018). 
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collecting data that would allow future reporters to write better rules.”83 
Much of the substantive contribution of the Draft Restatement 
centers on a reframing of conflicts questions around a two-step inquiry: 
first, determining the scope of state laws to determine whether any are 
applicable to the dispute at hand and, second, giving priority to one law 
if more than one applies after step one.84  This “scope and priority” 
approach has been a feature of Roosevelt’s conflicts scholarship.85  He 
summarizes the approach as involving two distinct questions: “scope 
questions are about whether a given law creates a right or not, conflicts 
questions are about when one right prevails over another.”86 
Some of the academic reaction to the project of the Third 
Restatement involves a wary skepticism.87  For example, Professor Lea 
Brilmayer and Daniel Listwa criticize the Draft Restatement for what 
they characterize as a contradiction inherent in its two-step structure, 
which they argue purports to base its methodology in statutory 
interpretation while lacking the “institutional capacity” to “ground[] a 
persuasive argument from statutory interpretation.”88 
In response, Roosevelt and Bethan R. Jones defend the Draft 
Restatement against this criticism on substantive grounds, arguing that 
the Draft Restatement’s rules for interpreting the scope of state statutes 
are sound based on a survey of known judicial decisions and, what’s 
more, bear only on the first, scope-defining step of the Draft 
Restatement’s conflicts inquiry.89  The Draft Restatement has separate 
mechanisms for determining priority among multiple potentially 
applicable statutes.90  Resolution of these sorts of substantive 
disagreements over the Third Restatement is not the goal of this Article.  
 
 83. Id. at 294–95. 
 84. Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA 
and Shady Grove, 106 N.W. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) [hereinafter Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in 
Federal Courts]. 
 85. See, e.g., Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law, supra note 10, at 2520; Roosevelt III, 
Choice of Law in Federal Courts, supra note 84, at 26. 
 86. Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law, supra note 10, at 2520. 
 87. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 403 (2000) 
(“How does one restate gibberish?”); Russell J. Weintraub, The Restatement Third of Conflict of 
Laws: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 75 IND. L.J. 679, 679 (2000) (“[I]t is not time to embark 
on the drafting of a third restatement.”); Lea Brilmayer & Daniel B. Listwa, Continuity and Change 
in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?, 128 
YALE L.J. F. 266, 267 (2018) (“The changes [to the Draft] are significant, but so are the continuities.  
Unfortunately, despite what its drafters would have us believe, the changes and continuities are not 
compatible.”). 
 88. See Brilmayer & Listwa, supra note 87, at 276. 
 89. See generally Roosevelt III & Jones, supra note 82. 
 90. See id. at 308.  
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Rather, I note them in order to establish where the discussion 
surrounding the Draft Restatement is currently focused and as an 
indication of where that focus is likely to remain. 
Though the debate about the wisdom and presentation of the two-
step approach to conflicts questions is important, it misses an opportunity 
to rethink choice of law from a different angle.  Specifically, it fails to 
critically evaluate not just the rules of decision for choice-of-law cases 
but also the identity of the decision-makers themselves.  Indeed, while 
Roosevelt has positioned the Third Restatement as fulfilling the vision of 
the Second Restatement, a vision of which “[a]cademics lost sight,”91 
debates about the substantive merits of the Third Restatement’s two-step 
model have themselves lost sight of an important procedural debate that 
was alive and well during the period surrounding the Second 
Restatement’s passage.  That debate centered on whether choice-of-law 
questions, and the concerns for state-based interests and policies that 
attend them, are best answered by state court judges.  The next Section 
summarizes that debate, which this Article suggests should once again 
become part of the discussion surrounding the Restatement’s efforts to 
summarize the current state of conflicts law and to chart a course for the 
future. 
D. The Forgotten Procedural Debate 
The choice-of-law revolution succeeded in convincing many states to 
drop the territorial vested rights approach and to consider instead states’ 
interests in their policies and domiciliaries.  But alongside those calls for 
a broader conception of when a particular state’s law might apply to a 
given issue, was a deep skepticism over whether the states themselves 
should implement that broadened conception.  For example, Currie’s 
early writings on interest analysis include not only a call for an approach 
to conflicts of law driven by statutory interpretation and state interest, but 
also an express desire for an increased federal role in answering conflicts 
questions.  In 1954, Currie considered how the recently enacted Change 
of Venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) would interact with choice of 
law.92  In particular, Currie considered whether a case transferred for the 
convenience of the parties to a new venue should apply the conflict-of-
laws rules of the new or old venue in the subsequent litigation.93  One 
 
 91. Id. at 295. 
 92. See Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 
(1954) [hereinafter Currie, Change of Venue]. 
 93. Id. at 407. 
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worry was that transfer of a case within the federal system might provide 
litigants with a tool to evade the choice-of-law results of the original 
forum state, thus endangering the vertical federal state uniformity that 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins94 sought to enforce.95  Currie suggested 
that perhaps we ought to “concede to the federal courts power to make an 
independent choice of law in conjunction with transfer.”96  Indeed, he 
also suggested that the principle should be extended generally to allow 
“the federal courts [to] be freed of [the] compulsion to follow state rules 
of conflict of laws.”97  In Currie’s view, “the implications of Section 
1404(a) provide an opportunity for gradual development,” and that 
opportunity might lead to a federally uniform system of choice of law as 
developing in federal courts and “more enlightened rules for choice of 
law.”98  Considering the choice-of-law problem in relation to change of 
venue led Currie to promote the virtues of federal uniformity in conflicts 
theory. 
Five years later, Currie published a retraction of his earlier view, 
saying, “This position assumes that it is possible to develop a rational 
system of conflict of laws in the abstract, independently of the policies 
and interests of the governments legitimately concerned . . . .  This, I am 
now convinced, is an impossibility.”99  But Currie’s retraction has more 
to do with the merits of a federally developed conflicts system as 
opposed to a state-developed one.  That is, Currie originally thought that 
perhaps the federal courts could develop a separate and free-standing 
conflicts regime that would be more uniform and better-reasoned than 
the assorted systems in place in the states.  That sort of independent 
federal common law of conflicts does seem to run afoul of the logic of 
Erie because it would erode vertical uniformity between state and federal 
courts.100  In addition, an independent federal common law of conflicts 
would conflict with the Rules of Decision Act, which requires 
application of state substantive law in diversity cases (where Congress 
does not provide otherwise).101 
But the general idea that there might be advantages to resolution of 
 
 94. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 95. Currie, Change of Venue, supra note 92, at 502–03. 
 96. Id. at 502. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 503. 
 99. Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 341, 343 (1960). 
 100. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018). 
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conflicts issues at the federal level rather than state level was picked up 
by Currie’s contemporaries.  Most notably, Professor William Baxter 
proposed that conflicts questions ought to be resolved in federal rather 
than state courts—not because federal courts could develop better 
substantive rules, but because federal courts were the institutions that 
could more credibly be trusted with the careful analysis of conflicting 
state interests that Currie’s theory required.102 
Baxter introduced the idea that, independent of method, conflicts 
questions are best resolved by federal rather than state institutions.103  
First, Baxter reasoned that state courts are best seen as implementers of 
state policy, an extension of the state’s substantive legal aims.104  As 
Baxter seems to have conceived of the division of governmental power, 
legislators enshrine state policy in law and the courts implement that 
policy by upholding the laws.  In that view of the role of state courts, 
leaving resolution of conflicts questions in the hands of state courts 
creates problems.  As Baxter explained: 
Currie, throughout his recent writings, has assumed that state courts 
would be the tribunals with ultimate responsibility for [choice of law 
adjudication] . . . .  That is a disquieting prospect.  The courts of each 
state are active participants in the formulation and implementation of 
local policies.  To place in their hands extensive responsibility for 
deciding when those policies will yield to and when they will prevail 
over the competing policies of sister states seems unsound. . . .  
Responsibility for allocating spheres of legal control among member 
states of a federal system cannot sensibly be placed elsewhere than with 
the federal government.105 
Underlying Baxter’s concern is a certain sort of skepticism about the 
judgment required in any conflicts regime.  Part of the point of the 
 
 102. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22–23 
(1963). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 23. 
 105. Id. at 22–23.  Notably, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit expressed similar concerns 
almost twenty years later in the context of international conflicts of law when deciding Laker 
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (1984).  The issue in the case was 
whether the antitrust law of the United States or of Great Britain should apply to a suit by Laker 
Airways alleging that predatory pricing had driven Laker out of business.  Id. at 917–18.  The D.C. 
Circuit acknowledged that it faced a choice between “fundamentally opposed national policies 
toward prohibition of anticompetitive business activity.”  Id. at 945.  The court, however, rejected 
the notion that it should balance the interests of each country in the application of its law to the 
dispute, reasoning that “this approach is unsuitable when courts are forced to choose between a 
domestic law which is designed to protect domestic interests, and a foreign law . . . . [T]here are 
substantial limitations on the court’s ability to conduct a neutral balancing of the competing 
interests.”  Id. at 948. 
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revolution in choice of law was to do away with a system (the First 
Restatement) that purported to provide algorithmic solutions to choice-
of-law problems.106  But, as previously described, courts found ways to 
influence the workings of the First Restatement system: for example, 
through characterization, public policy exceptions, or the substance-
versus-procedure distinction.107  In response, governmental interest 
analysis proposed not territorial rules, but an exercise in statutory 
interpretation, determining whether particular statutes were best read to 
apply to a given set of circumstances.108  Baxter points out that this 
process, too, involves room for manipulation and the exercise of 
judgment within a zone of permissible discretion.109  Indeed, that 
discretion was thought to be a feature of the system rather than a bug.110  
But if that is true, then one might worry about tasking state courts with 
that interpretation.  Specifically, one might worry that state court judges 
are inclined to read the statutes of their own states expansively while 
reading other states’ statutes narrowly, or that judges might “weigh” the 
interests in question111 and naturally be inclined to consider their own 
state’s interests to be more significant.  Because no rule is self-applying, 
any system of conflicts will involve some amount of human judgment, 
but the more such judgment becomes a feature of a particular conflicts 
approach, the more one might worry about the use of state rather than 
federal courts for resolution of conflicts issues. 
Complementary to concerns of bias toward home-state policies, 
Baxter feared that a state-by-state approach to conflict-of-laws problems 
is inconsistent with American federalism.112  As Baxter described, a 
 
 106. See supra Part I. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Baxter, supra note 102, at 21–22. 
 110. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 320–21 
(1990). 
 111. Currie did not endorse judicial weighing of interests—in his version of interest analysis, any 
interest in application of a law was enough and if two states each had an interest then the solution to 
the conflict was a default to forum law rather than a weighted assessment of the strength of the 
interests in question.  See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives, supra note 58, at 176.  Later 
theories were more comfortable with judicial weighing of interest to decide conflicts cases.  See, 
e.g., Cribb v. Augustyn, 696 A.2d 285, 288 (R.I. 1997) (endorsing an “interest-weighing approach” 
to tort cases).  Such weighing has as a virtue that it makes “true conflict” cases almost nonexistent 
(and so avoids the arbitrary imposition of forum law), but it does further exacerbate the problem of 
judicial discretion.  Baxter’s own preferred approach incorporates a kind of weighing, as judges 
faced with a case in which multiple interested states were instructed to consider which state’s policy 
would be most significantly impaired by the failure to apply its law and then to apply the law of that 
state.  See Baxter, supra note 102, at 8–9 (explaining a situation where a judge may have to weigh 
the underlying rules behind specific state laws). 
 112. Baxter, supra note 102, at 23–25. 
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federal system does not involve unquestioning deference to local policy, 
but rather a give and take between local autonomy and more unified 
national supervision.113  States must be given some freedom to craft local 
solutions to problems, and federalism requires that those solutions not be 
frustrated by national encroachment.  But, equally important, 
encroachment by other states can just as easily frustrate the policy aims 
of a particular state.  Baxter worried that a state-by-state conflicts 
approach traded the risk of federal encroachment on state policy goals 
for the certainty of encroachment on those goals by sister states: 
The justification for the cumbersome political arrangement known as 
federation is that certain problems are best handled at the local level 
because varying local circumstances may call for varying solutions and 
because varying attempts may reveal better solutions.  The premise of 
state autonomy as to local problems presupposes that each state will be 
permitted to effectuate, to the extent consistent with the identical right 
of every other state, the policies it adopts.  Those policies are as 
susceptible to frustration by sister states as by the central 
government.114 
Baxter’s analysis identifies two virtues of the federal system: 
responsiveness to local concerns and the benefits of experimentation.115  
Regarding the first justification, a conflicts system that leaves states free 
to judge their own interests in a dispute to be more significant than the 
interests of their sister states necessarily restricts the ability of sister 
states to exercise local control.116  Rather than promoting the 
development of policy best suited to the needs of a particular locality, 
those rules simply encourage parties to file lawsuits in states with 
favorable law.117 
In terms of the second justification, it is not clear that a state-by-state 
approach to conflicts does much to encourage experimentation and 
innovation.  True, different states have different conflicts systems, but 
the current approach encourages states to adopt systems that maximally 
 
 113. Id. at 25. 
 114. Id. at 24.  In a variety of ways, the law restraining states from extraterritorial application of 
their laws is underdeveloped, but in the context of the Commerce Clause, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that states acting locally can easily frustrate sister state or federal schemes of 
commerce regulation.  See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (explaining that 
facially neutral state statutes violate the Commerce Clause if “the burden imposed on [interstate] 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” (citing Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960))). 
 115. See Baxter, supra note 102, at 22–25.   
 116. See id. at 19–20. 
 117. Id. (expressing concern for forum selection under Currie’s state-by-state approach). 
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promote their own interests, rather than encouraging development of a 
better system along other dimensions (coherence with litigants’ 
expectations, ease of administration, etc.).118  In sum, the general 
federalism justifications for pushing decision making to the local level do 
not seem to hold in conflicts cases: selfish promotion of state interests 
actually erodes the local policy control of other states, and the benefits of 
experimentation are difficult to realize because the incentive is for states 
to experiment in the direction of greater promotion of the state’s own 
interest rather than in the direction of lowering total social cost. 
III. FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Conflicts and Judicial Federalism 
The early Currie-Baxter exchanges concerning whether conflicts 
rules ought to be developed at the state or federal level are of a piece 
with the broader discussion of the relative allocation of power between 
state and federal courts.  The same concerns present in the conflicts 
context are present in, for example, the criminal context regarding 
federal habeas corpus review119 or in the constitutional context regarding 
federal jurisdiction to hear claims of constitutional violations under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.120  In those settings, some scholars argue that the 
availability of a neutral federal forum is important to prevent state court 
bias in favor of local policy.  In Mitchum v. Foster, the United States 
Supreme Court itself characterized § 1983 as an expressly authorized 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act and described Congress’s intent in 
passing the law as grounded in a skepticism of state courts’ neutrality on 
constitutional issues.121  The Court explained, “Th[e] legislative history 
makes evident that Congress . . . was concerned that state 
instrumentalities could not protect [constitutional] rights; it realized that 
state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those 
rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts.”122  
 
 118. See id. 
 119. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 441–43 (1963) (describing the importance of a federal forum for 
review of state court processes, if not for review of substantive correctness). 
 120. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 
36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 239–55 (1988) (describing the debate over the relative competence of state 
and federal courts to adjudicate constitutional claims from the time of the Constitutional Convention 
to the Warren and Burger Courts). 
 121. 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
 122. Id. 
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But federal courts might be thought of as the more neutral adjudicative 
body not only because state court judges are apathetic toward federal 
interests (the Mitchum v. Foster concern), but also because state court 
judges are likely to actively prefer the interests of their home states.  
Indeed, something like that concern might lie behind the entire premise 
of diversity jurisdiction in federal courts.123  There are also institutional 
reasons to think federal court judges are likely to be more neutral among 
state interests—federal court judges enjoy constitutional protections of 
their salary and tenure,124 while many state court judges face routine 
elections or reappointment requirements.125 
If these structural sources of potential bias make federal courts 
preferable to state courts when enforcement of federal rights at the 
expense of state interests is at stake, then the same arguments ought to 
lead us to prefer federal to state courts when there is a clash between 
state interests in choice of law.  In the constitutional context, the concern 
is that states will under-enforce federal protections, while in the choice-
of-law context, the concern is that state courts will over-enforce their 
home states’ law.  Both concerns relate to a worry about the ability of 
state court judges to dispassionately enforce interests that do not cohere 
with the policy of their home state’s government.  We can be somewhat 
less concerned that federal judges will be subject to this kind of bias 
because of the constitutional mechanisms of Article III designed to 
insulate federal judges from the vicissitudes of state politics.  Also, at the 
appellate level, federal judges routinely deal with the laws of several 
states.  No circuit has fewer than three states in it, and some have many 
more, so federal appellate judges are comfortable looking at the laws of 
several states.126 
Perhaps one can question whether federal judges are institutionally 
more neutral than state court judges.  After all, even in a world of 
increasing presidential control over appointments to the Supreme Court 
and federal courts of appeals, there is still a strong norm of deference to 
 
 123. See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 541 (1989) 
(“The premise of diversity jurisdiction is that out-of-state litigants might be subject to bias in state 
courts, and that a federal trial forum therefore is needed.  Supreme Court diversity decisions 
recognize and rely upon this concern about state court bias.”). 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 125. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on 
Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333 (1988). 
 126. See Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United States District 
Courts, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_ 
map_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG27-NZYM] (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
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local senators when nominating district court judges.127  There are sound 
reasons for this practice.  For one, district court judges are considered 
less ideologically influential than appellate judges, so the basis of 
selection for district judges becomes less a matter of politics and more a 
matter of administrative competence.128  Because home-state senators 
retain influence over the appointment of district court judges, one might 
reasonably expect that federal district court judges, like state court 
judges, will have strong ties to the states in which they sit and strong 
loyalty to that state’s policy goals (or at a minimum, strong familiarity 
with the home state’s law and perhaps thus sympathy with its 
positions).129  But the question is not whether federal court judges are 
perfectly institutionally insulated from bias toward state interests.  
Rather, the relevant question is whether, on the margin, federal or state 
court judges are more likely to exhibit that bias in a given case.  Even if 
federal judges share in some of the favoritism for home-state policies 
that we expect of state court judges, there are countervailing institutional 
protections that make such bias relatively less likely.  For example, 
federal appellate cases are heard by panels of judges, very often from 
different states.  And, as federal cases make their way up the appellate 
ladder, that process is certain to introduce review from judges from 
various states, a phenomenon not present in the state court systems.  
Even if the influence of home-state senators makes the federal forum 
imperfect, it is still preferable to state courts.  What’s more, if choice-of-
law questions were resolved at the appellate level, rather than the district 
court level, then the federal judicial link to a particular home state would 
become even more attenuated.130 
B. Congressional Solutions 
Accepting that federal judges are preferable to state court judges for 
the resolution of conflicts questions, a procedural question remains: by 
what mechanism would federal courts obtain jurisdiction over interstate 
 
 127. See Carl Tobias, Curing the Federal Court Vacancy Crisis, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 
894 (2018) (“The Executive relies upon more conventional procedures when suggesting district 
nominees.  For instance, this White House, like recent predecessors, depends greatly on 
recommendations from home-state officers . . . .”). 
 128. See id. (noting that the current administration “bases most nominations principally on 
competence vis-à-vis ability to manage substantial caseloads”). 
 129. See id.; see also Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 57, at 1240–41. 
 130. Especially because, as mentioned, home-state senators have diminishing influence when it 
comes to appointing appellate level judges, at least in modern presidencies.  See generally Tobias, 
supra note 127. 
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conflicts cases?  At a high level, one can imagine two mechanisms that 
would accomplish that end.  First, one might imagine a bottom-up 
solution, with states voluntarily ceding control of choice-of-law issues to 
federal judges.  Second, the solution could instead come from the top 
down, with Congress or federal courts themselves asserting the authority 
to decide conflicts questions.  This Section examines each of those 
potential options in more detail. 
The initial possibility of a bottom-up approach can probably be 
dismissed rather quickly.  First, as a practical matter, states’ decisions to 
cede control to federal courts causes collective action problems.  No 
individual state will have any incentive to remove conflicts issues from 
its own state courts, thereby moving those issues from a home-state-
friendly forum in state court to a more neutral (and thus marginally more 
sister-state-friendly) forum in federal court.  A state would probably have 
enough incentive to weaken its own conflicts resolution infrastructure in 
this way only if it had some assurance that other states were going to 
move conflicts issues to the federal forum as well.  That sort of 
coordinated sacrifice likely requires some centralized (i.e., federal) 
action.131  Second, there is also a legal issue with the bottom-up 
approach: by what authority could the states themselves affect federal 
court jurisdiction?  Even if the states wanted to give conflicts 
determinations to federal judges, perhaps through some sort of 
certification process,132 it is reasonable to think that the states themselves 
have no power to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to resolve their 
conflicts questions.  Federal court jurisdiction is a matter of federal, and 
not state, law. 
Thus, the best, and perhaps only, hope for a shift in conflicts 
resolution to the federal forum lies in the top-down approach.  This 
Article proposes one such system.  As envisioned in this Article, 
Congress would create a process whereby state appellate courts would 
 
 131. One nonfederal solution that still would involve the coordinated action of many states is an 
interstate compact.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (limiting states’ powers to lay duties, 
have militaries, engage in war, or enter into compacts with other states).  But even an agreement 
among several states would have to overcome collective action and holdout problems, and states 
within an interstate compact would presumably lack the authority to alter the jurisdiction of federal 
courts. 
 132. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2018) contains a provision allowing for the certification of a question 
of law from a federal court of appeals to the Supreme Court, and most states have statutes allowing 
certification of state law questions to state supreme courts.  For a list of states that entertain certified 
questions from the federal courts, see 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4248 n.30 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database 
updated Aug. 2019).  One can perhaps imagine a similarly worded statute allowing state courts to 
certify questions of conflicts of law to a federal district court or court of appeals.  See infra Part IV. 
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certify choice-of-law questions to the federal courts of appeals for the 
circuit in which the forum is located.  That is, choice-of-law issues that 
reach the appellate stage in state court should be certified to federal 
courts of appeals for resolution if the state in question uses a choice-of-
law methodology that is sensitive to state interests or the merits of state 
laws.  As envisioned, state trial courts would make a choice-of-law 
determination in the first instance.  But, when choice-of-law issues reach 
appellate review, state courts would certify those questions to the federal 
courts of appeals for de novo review.  This Section lays the legal 
groundwork justifying federal authority to enact such a proposal, while 
the practicalities of the proposal are taken up in Part IV. 
1. Erie and Klaxon 
The top-down approach is not our system, and the prevailing 
understanding of how conflicts of law interacts with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins133 is perhaps the largest 
impediment to a top-down solution.  Erie stands for the proposition that 
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law rather than 
relying on their own exposition of the “general common law.”134  In so 
holding, the Court explained that “Congress has no power to declare 
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be 
local in their nature or ‘general’ . . . .  And no clause in the Constitution 
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”135  Given that 
explanation, a natural question is what to do with the remaining problem 
of conflicts of law, which has also developed in a common law fashion.  
If conflicts-of-law rules are substantive for Erie purposes, then federal 
courts sitting in diversity must follow the conflicts rules of the states in 
which they sit.136  But if conflicts rules regulate procedure, then perhaps 
there is more flexibility for the development of a separate federal 
approach. 
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., the Supreme 
Court held that federal courts sitting in diversity are bound to follow state 
conflicts law.137  The Court explained, “We are of [the] opinion that the 
prohibition declared in Erie . . . extends to the field of conflict of laws.  
The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware 
 
 133. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 134. Id. at 78.  
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (citing Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. 64). 
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must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.”138  Thus, 
we should regard state choice-of-law rules as substantive for Erie 
purposes, which implies that federal courts sitting in diversity should act 
as state courts would with regard to choice of law.  Under the Erie 
substance-versus-procedure distinction, this result makes sense: choice of 
law does not involve rules promulgated in accordance with the Rules 
Enabling Act139 and conflicts questions are often outcome 
determinative.140  If the Court’s goal is to promote Erie’s objective of 
preventing vertical forum shopping, the outcome of Klaxon does seem 
internally consistent. 
If that is so, then perhaps the development of a federal choice-of-law 
regime might be thought to require overruling Klaxon.  Indeed, Baxter, in 
advocating for the development of federal choice-of-law principles, 
argues that Klaxon is a poorly reasoned opinion that should be 
overruled.141  Baxter argues that Klaxon overemphasized the dangers of 
intrastate, vertical forum shopping between federal and state court, and 
that in so doing it allowed the states to adopt conflicts rules that 
intentionally subordinated sister-state interests.142  Currie, too, when 
making the case for increased federal control over conflicts issues, 
considered the possibility that “the rule of the Klaxon case may not 
survive, and that the federal courts will be freed of compulsion to follow 
state rules of conflict of laws.”143 
But on the logic of Klaxon itself, it is not clear that anything so 
 
 138. Id. (citation omitted). 
 139. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965) (“The test must be whether a rule really 
regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive 
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” (quoting 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941))). 
 140. See Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (deciding that statutes of 
limitations are substantive for Erie purposes).  Note that the Erie substance-versus-procedure 
distinction is drawn differently than the same distinction as employed in choice of law.  For 
example, Guaranty Trust held that a statute of limitations was substantive for Erie purposes, but that 
same limitations period may be procedural for choice of law if the limitations period is not so 
intertwined with the substantive right so as to be a condition of its vesting at all.  See id. (“Such 
particular rules of local law, however, do not in the slightest change the crucial consideration that if 
a plea of the statute of limitations would bar recovery in a State court, a federal court ought not to 
afford recovery.”).  See also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724–25 (1988) (collecting cases 
in which the forum applied its own statute of limitations even when a different substantive law 
governed).  
 141. Baxter, supra note 102, at 41–42. 
 142. See id.  In this sense, Baxter’s issue with Klaxon lies with the case’s understanding of the 
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause.  He argues that the Clause should not be read, as Klaxon 
permits, to allow a state to make the judgment that its own interests in a particular case are superior 
to those of another state.  Id.  
 143. Currie, Change of Venue, supra note 92, at 502. 
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drastic as overruling the decision would be necessary to increase the 
federal courts’ role in conflicts matters along the lines that this Article 
proposes.  For one thing, Klaxon purports to be an extension of the Erie 
doctrine, which relies on the premise that “Congress has no power” to act 
to make federal common law applicable in the states.144  But the 
Constitution is not similarly silent with regard to conflicts matters.  The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV provides that “Full Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”145  If Congress 
decided to act on the basis of its Full Faith and Credit authority, then the 
resulting conflict-of-laws rules might well fall outside of Erie’s (and 
therefore Klaxon’s) scope.146 
What’s more, if Congress purported to establish a uniform set of 
federal rules for conflicts cases pursuant to the authority of the Rules 
Enabling Act (or comparable legislation), that action too might be 
permissible under Erie, at least as the decision has come to be 
understood.  Under Justice Scalia’s approach in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,147 for example, the test applied 
to purported federal procedural rules is rather permissive.  Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that most procedural rules “affect[] a litigant’s substantive 
rights,” so what matters is whether the rule itself affects only the 
“manner and the means” of enforcement of substantive rights.148  
Broadly stated, one might reasonably think that conflicts-of-laws rules 
qualify as really regulating procedure because they are designed to 
choose among possible substantive laws that might apply, rather than 
forming a part of that substantive law themselves.149 
A procedural mechanism for conflicts questions incorporated into the 
Federal Rules, however, would apply only to cases in federal court, since 
state courts follow state procedural rules under Erie.  Because choice-of-
law cases involve plaintiffs with state law claims, the Rules Enabling Act 
approach would leave state courts free to engage in exactly the same kind 
 
 144. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added); see also infra Section III.B.2. 
 146. See William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 1371, 1401–04 (2012) (discussing the possibility of a congressional choice-of-law rule in cases 
involving the recognition of marriage). 
 147. 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 148. Id. at 407 (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). 
 149. And, as Justice Scalia notes, the Court has historically rejected every challenge to a federal 
rule that it has encountered.  Id. 
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of troubling interest analysis that prompted the desire to give conflicts 
questions to federal courts in the first place.  That partial coverage would 
accomplish relatively little to address the issues that this Article seeks to 
remedy, and it is for that reason that this Article justifies a proposed 
certification procedure using the Full Faith and Credit Clause rather than 
the Rules Enabling Act. 
Separately, this Article’s proposal also steers clear of any issues 
associated with Congress implementing substantive conflicts rules in a 
top-down manner.  Congressional action in the realm of substantive 
choice of law might preempt inconsistent state conflicts rules, and thus 
render Klaxon irrelevant, but there might be corresponding concerns 
about whether such a solution would infringe too greatly on states’ 
sovereignty.  States have historically been free to develop their own 
conflicts systems, and a federal law overriding that development might at 
least face state resistance, to say nothing of constitutional concerns about 
Congress’s authority to enact such rules. 
This Article’s procedural innovation is best understood as 
independent of those substantive choice-of-law concerns and, for that 
reason, as independent of Klaxon’ logic.  Klaxon merely requires that 
federal courts sitting in diversity use the state choice-of-law 
methodologies of the forum rather than substituting some alternative, 
federal approach.150  But, for this Article’s purposes, what is important is 
that federal courts are applying the methodology; it is less important 
which particular methodology they apply.  A system that involves a 
procedural preference for federal decision makers would still leave the 
states free to determine the substantive rules according to which choice 
of law was to proceed.  That sort of deference to state substantive choice 
of law is consistent with Klaxon, because it does not attempt to substitute 
federal common law for state law.  As the Klaxon Court held, “It is not 
for the federal courts to thwart . . . local policies by enforcing an 
independent ‘general law’ of conflict of laws.”151  This Article’s proposal 
requires federal courts to do no such thing.  Federal courts would still be 
enforcing the states’ conflicts laws rather than a general federal law of 
conflicts, but it would be only federal courts doing such enforcing when 
consideration of state interests or purposes was at issue. 
In this way, this Article’s proposal is in harmony with Klaxon and 
 
 150. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 151. Id.  Whether Congress, instead of the courts, could thwart local policies by imposing a 
substantive set of federal choice-of-law rules is a separate matter, resolution of which is not essential 
to this Article’s proposal. 
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consistent with the general goals of Erie.  There would still remain 
substantive vertical uniformity between the state and federal courts’ 
choice-of-law rules in a given state—that is, conflicts cases in Delaware 
would be decided according to Delaware choice-of-law rules in both 
state and federal courts.  Instead, when choice-of-law issues reach state 
appellate courts, this Article’s proposal provides a mechanism to 
substitute federal decision makers for state decision makers in the hope 
that such a substitution will lead to application of state substantive 
conflicts law that is less influenced by bias toward a forum state’s 
interests and policies. 
2. Full Faith and Credit 
It is important to justify the claim that Congress has the power under 
Article IV to enact legislation that would provide a mechanism for 
federal court resolution of choice-of-law issues when state interests are at 
stake.  The Supreme Court’s Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence 
proceeds from a background understanding of the Clause as designed to  
“alter the status of the several states as independent foreign 
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or 
by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts 
of a single nation.”152  As it has played out in specific cases, the Court 
has interpreted the goal differently depending on whether the case 
concerns judgments (which, if the issuing court had jurisdiction, must 
receive the same effect in a sister state that they would in the issuing 
state)153 or laws.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause has never been read to 
suggest that a sister state must apply the law of another state as if it was 
its own.  “The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel ‘a state to 
substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a 
subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.’”154 
Scholars disagree about the extent of Article IV’s implications for 
choice of law.  On the one hand, some scholars suggest that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause merely confers upon Congress the ability to 
implement the requirements of faith and credit defined by the Supreme 
Court.155  But in that view, Congress exceeds its power when it 
 
 152. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935). 
 153. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908) (requiring Mississippi to enforce 
a Missouri judgment that had clearly misapplied Mississippi’s own law). 
 154. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. 
Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)). 
 155. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
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“legislate[s] away” states’ responsibility to give full faith and credit to 
sister-state laws, specifying “when particular laws should or should not 
be applied by other states.”156  Critics of Congress’s enactment of the 
Defense of Marriage Act,157 which permitted states not to recognize the 
validity of same-sex marriages validly performed according to the laws 
of another state, marshalled Full Faith and Credit arguments against that 
law.158  But this Article’s proposal does not involve such strong 
congressional commands.  Rather than substantively identifying which 
among multiple competing state laws should be given effect in the states, 
a proposal for resolution of choice-of-law issues in the federal courts 
does not authorize or rule out the possibility of a particular substantive 
result.  Those who questioned DOMA on Full Faith and Credit Clause 
grounds did so because they argued that the law amounted to 
congressional permission to give sister states’ marriage laws credit that 
was less than full.  This Article’s proposal takes no particular position on 
what the constitutional limits of substantive Full Faith and Credit are—
wherever those limits are, states will be forced to respect them.  States 
would remain free to craft choice-of-law rules within those limits, but 
Congress would be acting so as to separate the crafting of those rules by 
state governments and the enforcement of those rules by the state 
judiciary. 
On the other hand, other scholars take a more expansive view of 
congressional authority under Article IV, with some going so far as to 
suggest that the Full Faith and Credit Clause essentially mandates a set of 
(heretofore unimplemented) choice-of-law rules.159  While that reading is 
contestable,160 this Article relies on no such strong understanding of the 
Clause’s effect.  Rather, it is enough for this Article’s purposes that the 
clause can be read to authorize congressional action regarding choice of 
 
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 2002–03 (1997) (rejecting a reading of the text that confers 
“plenary authority” upon Congress and instead empowers Congress only to “refine and implement” 
the requirements of faith and credit as defined by the Supreme Court). 
 156. Id. at 2003, 2006. 
 157. Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2018), was the primary 
target for Full Faith and Credit critiques. 
 158. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 70 (1996) (citing Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, 
Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Sen. Edward Kennedy (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. 
REC. S5931–33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)). 
 159. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 290–95 (arguing that the word “shall” creates a self-
executing obligation that mandates Full Faith and Credit be given to each state’s acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings). 
 160. See, e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 346–72 (1998) (rebutting 
Laycock’s argument that the Clause mandates choice-of-law rules). 
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law, without mandating that action.  That reading of the Clause would 
seem to have support among those who focus on the text’s original 
meaning, understanding the first part of the Clause as a substantive 
evidentiary command to the states (“Full Faith and Credit shall be 
given”),161 while leaving open to Congress in the Effects Clause the 
ability to craft more substantive national rules (“Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe . . . the Effect thereof”).162 
Indeed, from this perspective, one possible objection to this Article’s 
proposal is that it is too noncommittal given the Clause’s text.  That is, 
perhaps “Effect” as used in the Clause means only substantive effect, and 
therefore a statute that merely shifted the locus of choice-of-law 
decisional authority without specifically prescribing an effect is ultra 
vires.  There are two potential responses to such an objection.  First, 
while the second half of this section of Article IV of the Constitution is 
often called the “Effects Clause,” the Constitution also provides that 
Congress may “prescribe the Manner” by which “Acts, Records, or 
judicial Proceedings shall be proved.”163  Inclusion of congressional 
authority over both “Manner” and “Effect” would seem to encompass 
this Article’s procedural proposal. 
But on a view emphasizing original understanding, perhaps the 
“Manner” part of the clause is best read as referring only to the 
evidentiary status of other state “Acts, Records, or judicial 
Proceedings.”164  That is, perhaps the “Manner” clause provides for 
congressional authority over procedures to establish the validity of sister-
state laws as a matter of evidence, while the “Effects” clause provides for 
congressional authority over substantive effect.  If so, this Article’s 
proposal might initially appear to fall outside the scope of either of those 
grants of congressional authority.  But a second response to this line of 
criticism is that the greater congressional power to legislate regarding the 
effect of a sister-state’s law includes the lesser, less intrusive authority to 
permit state autonomy with regard to substantive choice-of-law rules 
 
 161. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 162. Id.  See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 1201, 1208–09 (2009) (arguing for an “evidentiary interpretation of the Clause” that “leaves 
the field open for deliberation and choice over the structure of our federal system”); David E. 
Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1655 (2009) (“Under the 
‘classic rule’ of faith and credit, the only provisions of federal law requiring that any of the United 
States give effect (as distinguished from prima facie evidentiary sufficiency) to sister-state ‘Acts,’ 
‘Records,’ or ‘judicial Proceedings’ are those provisions (if any) that Congress has legislatively 
prescribed.”).  
 163. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 164. Id. 
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while reserving federal authority over their implementation.  If the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause should properly be understood to provide “that 
Congress be granted plenary power to determine the extent of faith and 
credit to be accorded state acts, records, and proceedings in sister 
states,”165 then presumably that authority extends to “legislative choice 
over the structure of our federal system”166 that includes the mechanisms 
by which interstate choice-of-law questions make their way through the 
courts. 
Finally and more broadly, congressional action in this area is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s understanding of the animating 
spirit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause—namely “to make [the states] 
integral parts of a single nation.”167  It furthers that goal by preserving 
state autonomy over which choice-of-law approach they will follow 
while reducing opportunities for state actors to play favorites in interstate 
disputes.  That sort of give and take is consistent with the federalism 
values that the Supreme Court ascribes to the Clause and strikes a 
balance between the status quo of independent state authority and a 
potentially overbearing substantive congressional mandate. 
IV. A POTENTIAL PATH FORWARD 
As we have seen, there are good reasons to prefer that federal, rather 
than state court, judges make the choice-of-law decisions in conflicts 
cases.  Both practically and constitutionally speaking, however, there are 
good reasons to think that congressional action is necessary to achieve 
that result.  This Part will briefly sketch the mechanics of one possible 
form of congressional action permitting certification of choice-of-law 
questions from state courts to federal courts of appeals. 
A. State-Federal Certification 
Certification, in its most common form, arises when federal courts 
ask state supreme courts for an authoritative interpretation of state law.168  
The availability of the procedure is a function of state law.169  Where 
 
 165. Daniel A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the “Effects Clause” of Article IV Section 
1 and Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 336 (1998). 
 166. Sachs, supra note 162, at 1202. 
 167. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935). 
 168. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 132, § 4248. 
 169. See id. (“[I]t was and is clear that a federal court cannot compel a state court to answer 
questions in the absence of a state procedure.”).  Again, this confirms the necessity of a top-down 
approach to these issues.  Just as federal courts have no power to compel state courts to answer 
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available, certification has largely come to replace Pullman abstention as 
a more economical solution to the potential waste of resources involved 
in a federal court basing its decision on a new or questionable 
construction of state law.170  State courts generally have discretion 
whether to answer a certified question, and federal courts treat 
themselves as bound by the state court’s interpretation of state law.171 
A hypothetical choice-of-law certification procedure could work 
much the same way.  Congress could enact a statute requiring that states 
whose conflicts rules involve consideration of the relative interests or 
merits of state law certify choice-of-law questions to the federal court of 
appeals for the circuit in which the forum is located.  Federal courts of 
appeals are preferable to federal district courts for adjudication of these 
issues because appellate judges are less likely to have significant loyalty 
to the policies of a single state, as described above.172  As with existing 
certification, the certifying court would provide the necessary 
background factual information to allow the court to consider the 
questions of law at issue.173  Congressional authority for enacting a 
statute requiring certification would come from the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause—such certification of choice-of-law questions would be a part of 
the “Effect” of the “Acts” of the states in sister-state courts.174  Unlike 
the federal-state certification statutes that exist now, this review by 
courts of appeals would not be discretionary. 
Formally, then, such certification would involve a state court faced 
with a choice-of-law question certifying that question to a federal court 
of appeals.  Because Congress would have provided for such activity by 
statute, the choice-of-law question would become a matter of federal 
rather than state conflicts law, and so would be authoritatively resolved 
by a federal court.  The fact that choice of law then becomes a matter of 
federal law is crucial, for it would be odd to certify to federal courts a 
question of state (conflicts) law.  If choice of law was a state law 
question, then state courts would be free to overrule federal courts’ 
resolution of the conflicts issue after having certified the question to 
them initially.  As mentioned, Congress could leave the states some 
 
questions of law absent some enabling statute, state courts and legislatures would be powerless to 
create jurisdiction in the federal courts to answer questions of state conflicts law. 
 170. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of 
State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1681–86 (2003) (discussing the evolution of Pullman 
abstention and certification). 
 171. Id. at 1695. 
 172. See supra Section III.A. 
 173. See Nash, supra note 170, at 1693. 
 174. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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discretion as to the substance of the conflicts approach that they wanted 
to apply to cases in their courts, remaining agnostic between use of the 
First Restatement, Second Restatement, interest analysis, better law, or 
some other method (perhaps the finalized Third Restatement).175  States 
would choose to adopt one conflict-of-laws regime or another, but 
determinations of which law applies under whatever regime a particular 
state selected would be a matter of federal law. 
There are at least three potential concerns with this proposal worth 
discussing.  First, one might worry that instituting a process of federal 
court control over choice-of-law questions communicates an unsettling 
distrust of the state courts.  After all, the baseline in American 
jurisprudence is that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
and that state courts are as competent as federal courts at resolving issues 
of federal law.176  The choice is ordinarily left to litigants to decide 
whether to pursue legal claims in state or federal court.  But putting 
authority over conflicts questions exclusively in the hands of federal 
courts is different than, for example, opening up a federal forum for 
constitutional claims. 
In the constitutional context, we think that allowing litigants access 
to federal court provides litigants with an opportunity to bring their 
constitutional claims to a neutral federal forum.177  Litigants in conflicts 
cases, on the other hand, have every incentive to seek out the state court 
forum most likely to exhibit bias in favor of the litigant’s preferred legal 
rule.  In constitutional law, then, the availability of a federal forum is 
enough to encourage litigants toward a neutral forum.  But in conflicts, 
merely making a neutral forum available does not go far enough.  Thus, 
choice-of-law questions uniquely call for a federal solution.  Moreover, 
any distrust this procedure communicates is the same sort of distrust that 
arguably lies behind the entire premise of federal diversity jurisdiction.178 
Second, a potential stumbling block for this proposal is the increase 
in workload for the federal courts of appeals.  As a baseline, the federal 
 
 175. See infra Part II. 
 176. See, e.g., Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981) (“[T]he Court 
begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.  Congress, however, may 
confine jurisdiction to the federal courts either explicitly or implicitly.”) (citations omitted). 
 177. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 120 (discussing the longstanding concerns about the 
ability of state courts to protect constitutional rights).  
 178. See Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (“However, true the fact may 
be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation . . . it is 
not less true that the constitution itself . . . entertains apprehensions on this subject . . . [and so] has 
established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or 
between citizens of different states.”). 
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appellate courts saw 49,276 cases filed in 2018.179  The best available 
data on conflicts cases lists 5,242 such cases posted on Westlaw in 
2018.180  That number, however, does not include a significant quantity 
of state trial court cases that do not make it to Westlaw.  The number of 
choice-of-law cases in state appellate courts in 2018 was 957.181  
Assuming that litigants in state court appealed choice-of-law cases at 
rates similar to litigants in federal court, these numbers imply that an 
additional 7,000 cases decided in state trial courts may be unaccounted 
for in the survey.182 
Increasing the caseload of federal courts of appeals by over 7,000 
cases each year would be a significant burden.  If a court of appeals 
made a choice-of-law decision in each of those cases, choice of law 
would represent approximately 13% of the work of courts of appeals.  
Two considerations mitigate that concern.  First, the courts of appeals 
would retain discretion over the management of these cases.  Because 
choice-of-law issues are outcome determinative, three-judge panels in 
the courts of appeals must make the decisions.183  But there is no reason 
the certified choice-of-law questions would require, for example, full 
briefing or oral argument.  The decisions could be treated in a manner 
similar to aspects of the motions practice in the courts of appeals, which 
often involves limited briefing and judgments rendered solely on the 
papers. 
Second, and more substantively, a huge number of choice-of-law 
decisions could be eliminated if certification to federal courts of appeals 
was available only from state appellate courts.  The number of choice-of-
law cases decided in state appellate courts in 2018 was under 1,000, so 
the burden felt by the federal appellate judiciary of such a proposal 
would be significantly smaller.184  When combined with the practical 
considerations discussed above, the proposal seems manageable overall.  
An increased workload of around 1,000 motion-like decisions by federal 
 
 179. Judicial Business 2018, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-
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courts of appeals seems reasonable given the benefits of federal court 
determination of important choice-of-law issues.  Restricting the 
availability of choice-of-law certification to the state appellate stage also 
has ancillary benefits.  For one thing, such cases will have already 
undergone significant factual development, so federal courts of appeals 
would have the context necessary to make a relatively speedy informed 
determination. 
Third, any such certification process must ensure that the federal 
courts are not tasked with providing advisory opinions.  Under the 
Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends to “Cases” 
and “Controversies.”185  As the Supreme Court explained, “A justiciable 
controversy is . . . distinguished from a difference or dispute of a 
hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot.  
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal 
relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”186  The Court insisted 
that a controversy appropriate for judicial resolution under Article III 
must “admit[] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive 
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would 
be upon a hypothetical state of facts.”187  If resolution of a choice-of-law 
issue is too far removed from the substantive reality of the case, then 
perhaps any federal court judgment on that issue would be merely 
advisory. 
There are good reasons, however, to think that this worry is not fatal 
to this Article’s proposal.  For one, conflicts determinations are outcome 
determinative—they determine which among two or more conflicting 
laws will apply to a given dispute.188  That there is a conflict of law at all 
implies that the choice-of-law issue will involve a meaningful choice 
between applications of substantively different alternatives.  Also, as 
mentioned above, if certification to a federal court was only available 
once cases reached appellate stage in state courts, then there would be a 
robust factual record for the federal courts to consider as they evaluated a 
choice-of-law question.  That grounding in a concrete, factual reality 
addresses concerns about federal courts being asked to render a decision 
“advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical set of facts.”189  
Indeed, most state certification procedures require a certification order to 
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include a statement of all “the facts relevant to the question, showing 
fully the nature of the controversy out of which the question arose.”190  It 
seems likely that any choice-of-law question certified at the appellate 
stage could comply with a similar requirement. 
B. Appellate Review 
A final topic to consider in association with this proposal is how 
appellate review of choice-of-law cases would operate.  For cases 
originating in the federal courts the system is unchanged, so choice of 
law would continue to be a potential basis for appellate review of a final 
judgment of a lower court.  The state court process is a bit more 
complex.  As envisioned, state appellate courts would certify a choice-of-
law question to federal courts of appeals for a binding determination of 
the choice-of-law questions in a particular case.  Because Congress 
would have acted to federalize choice of law, the certified question is 
best thought of as a matter of federal (conflicts) law.  State intermediate 
and supreme courts, then, would not have interpretive authority on the 
conflicts questions vis-à-vis the federal courts of appeals.  But, as usual, 
litigants would be free to seek review of a court of appeals conflicts 
decision as an appeal to the United States Supreme Court once the state 
court case reached the highest state court.191 
It is also important to clarify that, as a formal matter, certification of 
choice-of-law questions to federal courts of appeals would not violate the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  In general, outside of the habeas context, 
Rooker-Feldman requires that the only federal court review of state court 
decisions is via the United States Supreme Court.192  But, as it has done 
in the context of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, Congress can 
authorize federal court review of state court judgments.  Even setting 
aside Congress’s authority to provide for federal court review, there are 
good reasons for thinking that the sort of certification envisioned here 
does not implicate the core concern of Rooker-Feldman.  Rooker-
 
 190. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] § 6(a)(2) (amended 1995), 12 
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controversy in which the questions arose.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3203 (West 2008) (“A 
certification order shall set forth . . . a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and 
showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose.”). 
 191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2018). 
 192. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) (“[A] United States 
District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.  
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Feldman involves a subsequent action filed by a losing party in federal 
district court review of an adverse state court judgment.193  Certification 
of choice-of-law questions would involve state appellate courts, rather 
than state court “losers,” initiating the request for a ruling. 
Another way to think about the potential Rooker-Feldman concern is 
to consider formally how jurisdiction interacts with the certification 
process.  Even in familiar contexts, that is a difficult question.194  
Professor Jonathan Remy Nash suggests that we can think of certification 
as involving either a “unitary” or “binary” conception of federal 
appellate jurisdiction.195  The unitary conception would imply that 
certification involves something like a transfer of the case from state to 
federal court for the limited purpose of deciding the choice-of-law issue.  
That conception would seem to eliminate Rooker-Feldman concerns, 
because the federal court review would not result from “the losing party 
in state court fil[ing] suit in federal court after the state proceedings 
ended.”196 
On a binary conception, the court accepting certification is actually 
accepting jurisdiction over a separate “case” distinct from the case 
pending before the certifying court.197  The Rooker-Feldman issue is 
probably closer under this framework because it would involve the court 
of appeals accepting jurisdiction over a case for the purposes of 
reviewing a state court conflicts decision.  But the basis for the case 
would be a certified request from a state appellate court, rather than the 
filing activity of a state court loser.  Thus, even on the binary conception, 
it seems acceptable for Congress to create a basis for original jurisdiction 
in federal courts of appeals over cases certified by state appellate courts 
for resolution of choice-of-law issues.  That situation does not implicate 
the narrow circumstances of Rooker-Feldman, in which a losing state 
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CONCLUSION 
The Third Restatement of Conflicts of Law provides a concrete 
opportunity for serious scholarly discussion of choice of law.  This 
Article urges that procedural considerations become a larger part of that 
discussion.  Choice of law has come to involve a standards-based 
consideration of a variety of issues concerning the nuances of state 
policy choices and the intensity of state interests in those policies.  Any 
such consideration leads naturally to the tendency for a state to overstate 
its own policy interests and to discount the interests of sister states.  
Federal resolution of choice-of-law issues is thus attractive because 
federal court judges are more insulated from this bias.  A procedure that 
required state courts, at the appellate review stage, to certify choice-of-
law issues to federal courts of appeals would help to mitigate those 
concerns.  Such a procedure would be constitutionally permissible and 
consistent with the broad spirit of our federal system. 
 
